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FINGERPRINT NOT RECOGNIZED: WHY THE UNITED STATES
NEEDS TO PROTECT BIOMETRIC PRIVACY
Blake Benson*
Rising interest in biometrics—the modern umbrella term for
physical and behavioral characteristics possessed by humans and
used to identify one another—has motivated large technology
companies to produce products that allow consumers to access vital
information using only their unique biometric identifiers. Because
biometric information is unique to each person on the planet, it is a
valuable way to secure personal data. However, the uniqueness and
permanence of biometric information heighten the consequences of
security breaches when compared to the compromise of simple
alphanumeric passwords. Growing interest in biometric technology
across the United States has motivated a small number of state
legislatures to address the collection, storage, and distribution of
biometric information by business entities, but the legal framework
for handling that information is largely underdeveloped. As
biometric identification becomes more prevalent, the rest of the
states and the federal government must decide how to address
privacy concerns. Passing new laws, retrofitting old laws to address
new technologies, and choosing not to take legislative action are
just a few of the options both state and federal governments are
considering. Based on the level of interest, and the number of
concerns, with biometric identification technology, the federal
government is best equipped to address these concerns. If Congress
chooses to introduce biometric privacy legislation, which would
provide uniform protection for all American consumers and
employees, there will certainly be relentless lobbying from the tech
*
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like to thank Editor-in-Chief Erin Larson, Executive Editors Joseph Hjelt &
Jordan Luebkemann, and Notes Editors Christopher Burks & Amy Leitner for
their advice and hard work throughout the publication process.

161

162

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 19: 161

sector concerning the contents of the bill. Congress will need to
balance biometric privacy with corporate interests if they decide to
try and enact a much-needed biometric privacy law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Humans have been using physical and behavioral traits, or
biometrics, to identify one another for thousands of years.1
Biometrics are officially defined as “measurable physical and
behavioral characteristics that enable the establishment and
verification of an individual’s identity” by the Biometric Research
Group.2 Ancient Egyptians used physical characteristics to
differentiate between trustworthy and untrustworthy traders, while
the Babylonians verified business transactions by stamping
fingerprints into clay tablets as early as the sixth century. 3 By the
nineteenth century, societies used physical characteristics, such as
height, arm length, and fingerprints, to document convicted
criminals and identify suspects in ongoing criminal investigations.4
Modern technology has made cataloging and using physical
characteristics for various purposes far easier and more expansive.5
Today, using biometrics to identify someone is just another part of
daily life.6 For example, modern smartphones offer users the option
of unlocking their device with a fingerprint before they log in to their
Facebook application and use its facial recognition function to tag
friends in photos.7 Technology has made physical biometric
identification a valuable, and readily available, tool for countless
people across the globe.8
Commercial use of biometric technology has become
particularly divisive in the United States. A 2017 study conducted
by Viewpost, an American corporation offering online payment
1
See Stephen Mayhew, History of Biometrics, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Jan. 14,
2015), http://www.biometricupdate.com/201501/history-of-biometrics.
2
Rawlson King, What Are Biometrics?, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Jan. 24, 2016),
http://www.biometricupdate.com/201601/what-are-biometrics-2.
3
Silvio Barra et al., Unconstrained Ear Processing: What Is Possible and What
Must Be Done, in SIGNAL AND IMAGE PROCESSING FOR BIOMETRICS 130 (Jason
Scharcanski et al. eds., 2014); Mayhew, supra note 1.
4
Mayhew, supra note 1.
5
See generally April Glaser, Biometrics Are Coming, Along with Serious
Security Concerns, WIRED (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:00 AM), https://www.wired.com
/2016/03/biometrics-coming-along-serious-security-concerns/.
6
See id.
7
See id.
8
See id.
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services, found that 80% of the 1,000 Americans surveyed are “in
support of biometrics-enabled payments technologies and
currencies” and that 50% “believe fingerprint technology will be
used for authentication to pay and receive payments over the next
10 years.”9 A conflicting study prepared by the Consumer
Technology Association (CTA) in March of 2016 reported that 28%
of American adults are “less than comfortable” and another 42%
“have neutral sentiments” about the usage of biometric technology
for commercial purposes.10 Yet another survey, conducted by the
information technology corporation Unisys, determined that 33% of
the 11,244 Americans surveyed actually thought biometric
identifiers were “effective security feature[s].”11 Conflicting survey
results seem to indicate that commercial use of biometric technology
has divided Americans into two categories: those that are willing to
sacrifice their right to privacy for efficient, accurate biometric
identification features and those that are not. Of course, it is possible
that the survey results referenced may be skewed by questions that
emphasize either privacy or innovation. Biometric identification
features offer improved convenience and accuracy to consumers,
but a large number of Americans are not willing to sacrifice the
privacy of their unique identifiers for the ability to log into their
bank account with a fingerprint instead of an alphanumeric
password.12
Biometric technology offers Americans a vast array of benefits,
but they come at a cost.13 Biometric information is both “inherently
public,” meaning that other people can easily view and gain access
9

Justin Lee, Study Finds Americans Support Biometrics-based Payment
Systems, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (July 18, 2017), http://www.biometricupdate.com
/201707/study-finds-americans-support-biometrics-based-payment-systems.
10
Recent Opinion Surveys on Public Perceptions of Biometrics, INT’L
BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY ASS’N, https://www.ibia.org/download/datasets/3372
/Public-Perceptions-of-Biometrics-opinion-surveys%20.pdf.
11
Justin Lee, Unisys Survey Finds One-third of Americans View Biometrics on
Smartphones as Effective, BIOMETRIC UPDATE (July 6, 2015),
http://www.biometricupdate.com/201507/unisys-survey-finds-one-third-ofamericans-view-biometrics-on-smartphones-as-effective.
12
See Glaser, supra note 5.
13
See id. (telling readers that biometrics are beneficial to Americans but that
they also have many drawbacks that must be properly mitigated).
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to it, and “inherently private” because every American possesses
unique biometric identifiers.14 Unlike a password, which is designed
to be kept secret and can be changed in seconds, biometric
information is permanent, making it extremely sensitive material.15
Just one example of this privacy concern is how often American’s
leave fingerprints on different surfaces.16 The inherently public
nature of biometrics leads to another pressing issue: the collection
and usage of biometric information by businesses, law enforcement
officials, and other third parties.17 Facebook’s opt-in facial
recognition feature is one example of a third-party using the
inherently public nature of biometrics for a proprietary purpose. 18
Third-party usage of biometrics does not stop at physical
characteristics either: Israeli firm BioCatch is developing a
technology to track computer usage behavior for detection of
fraudulent banking and shopping activity.19 Biometric technology
can make daily activities, like logging into a phone, easier and more
secure, but there are obvious concerns that must be addressed
because biometric identifiers can be classified as both public and
private information.20
Although state governments have taken notice of the rising
number of corporations investing in biometric technology, few
states have actually taken action to mitigate the negative impacts of

14

See id.
See Chiara A. Sottile, As Biometric Scanning Use Grows, So Does Security
Risk, NBC (July 24, 2016, 7:29 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/mach/mach
/biometric-scanning-use-grows-so-do-security-risks-ncna593161 (explaining that
biometric data breaches are extremely severe because identifiers are unique to
each individual and cannot be changed if the information is stolen or
disseminated).
16
See Glaser, supra note 5 (explaining that finger prints are left on everyday
objects, like glassware, and businesses interested in acquiring those prints can do
so with relative ease if they so choose).
17
See id. (establishing that other government entities, like the IRS, hospitals,
and banks, are third parties that use biometric identification technology).
18
Stuart Dredge, 10 Things You Need to Know About Biometrics Technology,
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 17, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014
/sep/17/10-things-to-know-about-biometrics.
19
Id.
20
See Glaser, supra note 5.
15
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the technology on individual privacy.21 Illinois, Washington, and
Texas are currently the only states that have enacted commercial
biometric privacy laws.22 As of the publication date of this Recent
Development, no federal efforts to pass a commercial biometric
privacy law have been reported. Other states have biometric privacy
laws pending, and Montana is all but certain to pass its own
biometric privacy law this year.23 The existing laws in Illinois,
Washington, and Texas impose civil penalties for violations, but
only the Illinois law offers citizens a private right of action. 24
Washington and Texas’s commercial biometric privacy laws leave
enforcement up to the state’s attorney general.25 As more states
decide whether to protect their citizens’ biometric privacy, the
question of whether the federal government should step in and pass
a law regulating the collection of biometrics on a national scale
becomes increasingly relevant.
This Recent Development advocates for a much-needed federal
law that protects consumers and employees from identity theft
stemming from the improper or negligent commercial usage of
biometric information. It is important for this law to include a
private right of action so citizens themselves can hold commercial
entities responsible for potential misuses of biometric information.
A federal law offering citizens a private right of action will have
drawbacks, including staunch opposition from tech companies and
numerous courtroom battles over statutory interpretation. Most new
laws require some level of interpretation,26 but a biometric privacy
law would be particularly troublesome because there is no
21

Karla Grossenbacher & Christopher W. Kelleher, Hazards Ahead: Uptick in
Biometric Privacy Laws Can Put Employers in Hot Seat, EMP. L. LOOKOUT (Oct.
3, 2017), https://www.laborandemploymentlawcounsel.com/2017/10/hazardsahead-uptick-in-biometric-privacy-laws-can-put-employers-in-hot-seat/.
22
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008); 11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 503.001 (West 2009); H.B. 1493, 65th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
23
See Grossenbacher & Kelleher, supra note 21.
24
See COMP. STAT. 14/10; BUS. & COM. § 503.001; H.B. 1493 (Wash. 2017).
25
See BUS. & COM. § 503.001; H.B. 1493 (Wash. 2017).
26
See generally LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS (2014)
(establishing that American courts frequently need to interpret statutes when
applying them to specific cases).
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universally accepted set of definitions for biometric identifiers.
Even a thorough definitions section will not be able to predict every
application of biometric technology in the future.27
Current and future uses for biometric technology, as well as the
policy behind why these uses demand a high-level of privacy
protection, appear in Part II of this Recent Development. Part III
discusses the current landscape of state biometric privacy
regulations in more detail and explains why existing laws do not
provide adequate protection for biometric privacy. Part IV makes
recommendations on what a federal biometrics law could, and
should, look like. Finally, Part V evaluates the arguments for and
against enacting a federal biometric privacy law before concluding
that a federal law is necessary.
II. WHY BIOMETRIC PRIVACY MATTERS
As more companies develop products that utilize biometric
technology, privacy continues to become an increasingly important
consideration.28 Technology companies began releasing biometric
security devices for computers in the 1990s, but early versions did
not attract customers because they were “clunky” and
“inconvenient.”29 Motorola released the first smartphone with a
fingerprint scanner in 2011, but Apple’s addition of scanners to the
iPhone in 2013 ignited mainstream interest in commercial biometric
technology.30 Some privacy experts have argued, and continue to
27
See Lara Tumeh, Washington’s New Biometric Privacy Statute and How It
Compares to Illinois and Texas Law, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/washington-s-new-biometric-privacy70894/ (showing that even states with existing biometric privacy laws use
different definitions for “biometric identifier”).
28
See generally Glaser, supra note 5 (discussing the growing usage of
biometric technology in the United States and identifying the serious harm that
could result from the misuse of biometric information).
29
See Jack M. Germain, IBM Introducing Fingerprint Reader into Laptop,
TECH NEWS WORLD (Oct. 4, 2004, 4:44 AM), https://www.technewsworld.com
/story/37017.html (reporting that IBM introduced one of the first built-in
fingerprint scanners for computers and establishing that early biometric security
technology was not practical or popular).
30
See Glaser, supra note 5 (highlighting other types of biometric technology in
development including, but not limited to, heartbeat identification, speech pattern
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argue, that the inherent privacy of biometric information makes it
safer than alternatives like a PIN number or a user-generated
password.31 After all, these proponents assert, individual physical
characteristics, like fingerprints, appear to be unique and incapable
of duplication.32
However, Georgetown Law professor Alvaro Bedoya, the
executive director of the school’s Center on Privacy & Technology,
argues that biometric information is not as “inherently private” as
proponents want to think, and to the contrary, is actually inherently
public.33 He points out that even though each American has unique
biometric information, accessing that information is as easy as
taking a picture of someone’s facial features or taking fingerprints
off of a glass after having a drink.34 While it is easy to notice another
person’s biometric identifiers, like fingerprints, those identifiers are
still extremely private information unique to each individual.
Biometric identifiers, like fingerprints and facial structure, are what
makes each human being unique and deeming that information to be
solely public conveys to the world that biometric information should
be treated as a public resource. Classifying biometric identifiers as
solely public information jeopardizes the biometric privacy of every
American and this classification should be rejected in favor of one
that emphasizes the private and public characteristics of biometric
information.
Bedoya’s assertion that biometric identifiers are “inherently
public” is difficult to reconcile with the idea that those same
identifiers should be treated as highly sensitive information, but his
concerns about the misuse of biometrics are far from hypothetical.
identification, and even vascular eye pattern identification); Casey Newton,
Apple’s New iPhone Will Read Your Fingerprint, VERGE (Sept. 10, 2013, 1:57
PM), https://www.theverge.com/2013/9/10/4715372/confirmed-apple-iphone5s-will-include-touch-id-fingerprint-scanner.
31
See Glaser, supra note 5 (explaining that even though biometric technology
is safer than traditional alphanumeric passwords in that it uses characteristics
unique to each American, that same uniqueness makes biometrics more harmful
if compromised due to one’s ability to document another’s biometric
information).
32
See id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
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Bedoya’s concerns were confirmed when Jason Chaikin, the
president of a corporation that produces finger scanning technology,
used Play-Doh to preserve a tester’s fingerprints and unlock an
iPhone at a demonstration.35 Chaikin also managed to use the same
process to unlock a Samsung Galaxy and an LG Nexus in a matter
of minutes.36 Nathaniel Couper-Noles of Neohapsis, a security firm
owned by Cisco, has even handled situations where fingerprints
were stolen by taking high-quality photographs without any physical
replication.37 Biometric information may be unique to each
individual, but that does not make it completely secure.
The inherent and permanent uniqueness of biometric
information makes it more harmful if compromised than traditional
security mechanisms, such as a simple alphanumeric password. 38
Passwords and credit cards “can be easily replaced,” but “it is very
difficult . . . for any individual to disassociate oneself from one’s
biometric [information].”39 Biometric information linked to an
individual in a database is exceedingly difficult to replace or change
because it is unique to that person.40 That being said, a rare set of
exceptional circumstances can change an individual’s biometric
identifiers.41 More alarming, catalogs of biometric information
stored on a computer database can be easily compromised in the
same way as any other computer system.42 Acquiring someone’s
biometric information could be as simple as acquiring an
35

Jeff John Roberts, This Guy Unlocked My iPhone with Play-Doh, FORTUNE
(Apr. 7, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/04/07/guy-unlocked-iphone-play-doh/.
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
See Glaser, supra note 5 (explaining that traditional identification methods
can easily be changed and replaced, whereas biometrics stay unique to a single
person forever).
39
Rigoberto Chinchilla, Ethical and Social Consequences of Biometric
Technologies, AM. SOC’Y FOR ENGINEERING EDUC. 1, 5–6 (2012),
https://www.asee.org/public/conferences/8/papers/3789/view.
40
Id.
41
See Kaveh Waddell, When Fingerprints Are as Easy to Steal as Passwords,
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 24, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive
/2017/03/new-biometrics/520695/ (explaining that bodily changes, such as blood
vessel alteration, stemming from pregnancy can confuse biometric identification
technology).
42
Chinchilla, supra note 39, at 5–6.
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alphanumeric password once databases are created.43 The same
unique characteristics that make biometric identification technology
so appealing also make mitigating compromised data considerably
more difficult than resetting a stolen password.44
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF AMERICAN BIOMETRIC
PRIVACY LAW
A select number of state legislatures have introduced or passed
biometric privacy laws in response to the rising number of
commercial products that offer biometric recognition.45 Illinois
passed the Biometric Information Privacy Act in 2008, making it the
first state with a commercial biometric privacy law.46 Texas
followed Illinois’s lead and became the second state to enact a
biometric privacy law in 2009,47 while Washington became the third
state when it passed H.B. 1493 in May 2017.48 No other states have
joined Illinois, Texas, and Washington, but biometric privacy laws
are pending in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.49 At the time of
publication, Congress has not taken public steps towards a
nationwide biometric privacy law.
Although state governments are just beginning to regulate
commercial collection of biometric information, they have been
restricting biometric collection by schools and government actors
for years.50 Existing and pending state biometric privacy laws tend
to fall into three categories: laws that restrict the collection of
43

Id.
Glaser, supra note 5.
45
See generally Ted Claypoole & Cameron Stoll, Developing Laws Address
Flourishing Commercial Use of Biometric Information, AM. BAR ASS’N (May
2016), https://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2016/05/08_claypoole.html
(recognizing that the popularity and privacy concerns associated with biometric
technology have caused states to regulate collection of biometrics).
46
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008).
47
11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2009).
48
H.B. 1493, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); Washington Becomes Third
State to Enact Biometric Privacy Law, HUNTON & WILLIAMS PRIVACY & INFO.
SEC. BLOG (June 1, 2017), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/06/01
/washington-becomes-third-state-enact-biometric-privacy-law/.
49
Grossenbacher & Kelleher, supra note 21.
50
Claypoole & Stoll, supra note 45.
44
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biometrics belonging to students, laws that restrict the collection of
biometric information by government entities, and laws that restrict
the collection of biometric information by businesses.51 Despite its
commercial nature, the healthcare industry is exempted by state
biometrics laws because medical privacy is protected by the federal
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 52
Many states, including North Carolina and West Virginia, already
protect the biometric information of students at K-12 schools.53
These states restrict the collection of student biometric information
by only allowing disclosure with parental consent and requiring the
information to be destroyed once the owner of the biometric data
graduates or switches schools.54 Maine and New Hampshire restrict
the collection of biometric data related to personal identification,
like driver’s licenses, but they allow biometric data collection for
law enforcement or immigration purposes.55 Even though many
states protect citizens against specific instances of biometric
collection, only Illinois, Washington, and Texas have laws that
prevent the collection of biometrics for general commercial use.56
A. The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act
Illinois became the first state to regulate the commercial
gathering of biometric information by enacting the Biometric
Information Privacy Act (BIPA) in 2008.57 “Biometric information,”
as broadly defined by the Act, means “any information, regardless
of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an
individual’s biometric identifier used to identify an individual;” it
further defines “biometric identifier” as “a retina or iris scan,
fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan of hand or face geometry.”58 BIPA
51

Id.
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008).
53
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C‑402.5 (2016); W. VA. CODE § 18-2-5h (2012).
54
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 115C‑402.5; W. VA. CODE § 18-2-5h; see also Claypoole
& Stoll, supra note 45.
55
ME. STAT. tit. 29, § 1401 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 260:10-b (2014).
56
COMP. STAT. 14/10; 11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West
2009); H.B. 1493, 65 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017); 2017 Wash. Sess. Laws
1141.
57
COMP. STAT. 14/10.
58
Id.
52
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prohibits selling, trading, leasing or otherwise profiting from
collected biometric data and mandates transparency in the
collection, use, and storage of that data.59 In addition, the Act
requires corporations to obtain written consent from employees and
customers when acquiring, using, or storing biometric information
from these individuals.60 The Act provides consumers and
employees a private right of action for violations.61 Photographs,
digital signatures, writing samples, and biological samples are
excluded from coverage under BIPA.62
Since its passage, BIPA has been a lightning rod for legal
action.63 Between July 2017 and publication, twenty-six class-action
lawsuits have been filed against Illinois employers under BIPA. 64
Most of the employee-filed lawsuits assert that employers, including
Speedway and InterContinental Hotels Group, are collecting and
storing fingerprint data without consent.65 The plaintiffs in those
suits are accusing the employers of collecting the fingerprints from
machines that use biometric data to clock in employees for their
shifts.66 By not obtaining consent or notifying employees of how
their biometric information is being collected and stored, employers
violate BIPA.
The flood of BIPA lawsuits is not limited to employees suing
employers; consumers are also turning to BIPA to protect their
biometric information in both state and federal court.67 One notable
59

Id.
Id.; see also Amy Korte, Illinois Employers Flooded with Class-Action
Lawsuits Stemming from Biometric Privacy Law, ILL. POL’Y (Oct. 17, 2017),
https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-employers-flooded-with-class-actionlawsuits-stemming-from-biometric-privacy-law/.
61
COMP. STAT. 14/10.
62
Id.
63
Korte, supra note 60 (establishing that Illinois has seen a massive number of
lawsuits under BIPA since it was passed in 2008).
64
Id.
65
Complaint, Howe v. Speedway, LLC, No. 1:17-CV-07303 (N.D. Ill. filed
Oct. 10, 2017); Complaint, Zepeda v. InterContinental Hotels Group, No. 2017CH-08904 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed June 27, 2017); see also Korte, supra note 60.
66
Korte, supra note 60.
67
See Justin Lee, Facebook Facial Recognition Lawsuit Put on Hold,
BIOMETRIC UPDATE (Feb. 9, 2017), http://www.biometricupdate.com/201702
/facebook-facial-recognition-lawsuit-put-on-hold; see also Facing Privacy Suits
60
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federal BIPA case revolves around Facebook’s facial recognition
software.68 The plaintiffs could file in federal court because they
were diverse parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.69 The plaintiffs
in the lawsuit against Facebook claimed that the website’s tag
suggestion feature violates BIPA by collecting and storing unique
biometrics identifiers data from their uploaded images without
providing written notice or gaining consent from their users.70
The social media giant defended its activity by asserting the
plaintiffs must prove an injury in fact resulting from the site’s
misuse of biometric information, not just a technical violation of
BIPA, to maintain standing.71 An injury in fact must be “an invasion
of a legally protected interest” that is “concrete and particularized”
and cannot be “conjectural or hypothetical.”72 On top of its assertion
that the plaintiffs do not have standing, Facebook also contends that
BIPA violates the Commerce Clause73 and that the site’s users
actually do consent to the usage of facial recognition software when
they allow themselves to be tagged in online photos.74

About Facial Recognition: BIPA Cases Move Forward as More States Consider
Passing Biometric Data Laws, HUNTON & WILLIAMS PRIVACY & INFO. SEC.
BLOG (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.huntonprivacyblog.com/2017/10/04/facingprivacy-suits-about-facial-recognition-bipa-cases-move-forward-as-more-statesconsider-passing-biometric-data-laws/.
68
In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1172
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (holding that the plaintiff users stated a claim under BIPA).
69
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012) (stating that federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction over diversity cases where the parties are citizens of different states
and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000).
70
See In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1172.
71
Id.
72
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548 (2016) (quoting Lujan v. Defs.
of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2134 (1992)).
73
See Justin Lee, Facebook Says Illinois Biometrics Privacy Law Violates
Constitution, BIOMETIRC UPDATE (Nov. 21, 2016), http://www.biometricupdate.com
/201611/facebook-says-illinois-biometrics-privacy-law-violates-constitution
(claiming that the BIPA violated the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution
because it allows Illinois to improperly strain or discriminate against interstate
commerce).
74
Jared Bennett, Facebook: Your Face Belongs to Us, THE DAILY BEAST (July
31, 2017), https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-facebook-fights-to-stop-laws-onfacial-recognition.
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B. BIPA Litigation & Standing Requirements
The federal suit against Facebook has reached the Ninth Circuit,
but the Court has delayed issuing a ruling, pending the outcome of
the recently remanded Spokeo case.75 The issue in Spokeo was
whether a per se violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)
constituted an injury in fact in the context of a federal standing
inquiry.76 In August 2017, the Ninth Circuit held that a per se
violation of FCRA was enough to trigger a private cause of action
under the act even if the plaintiffs did not suffer concrete injuries.77
The per se violation in Spokeo was the misrepresentation of the
plaintiff’s employment status, age, and marital status.78 More
specifically, the Ninth Circuit stated that “intangible harms” can
constitute an injury in fact when the violation of a federal statute
presents “a risk of real harm” to a “concrete interest.”79 Essentially,
the Ninth Circuit’s most recent Spokeo decision determined that per
se violations of a statute, like misrepresenting a user’s personal
information, will satisfy the injury in fact component of a standing
analysis only if there is a risk of actual monetary or physical harm.
A Ninth Circuit decision on the BIPA lawsuit against Facebook
is likely to be issued soon since Spokeo has been decided on remand.
Based on the Ninth Circuit’s more recent holding in Spokeo, the
plaintiff’s suing Facebook have a strong argument in favor of proper
standing if they can establish a per se BIPA violation and can also
prove that the violation could cause “concrete harm.”80 Considering
that stolen biometric identifiers can be used to access the victim’s
bank information,81 per se BIPA violations could easily result in
concrete harms. Since the Ninth Circuit’s newly released Spokeo
decision concerned a federal rather than state law, the court will
75

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. at 1548.
Id.
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Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1115 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138
S.Ct. 931.
78
Id. at 1115.
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Id. at 1113.
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Id. at 1108.
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Michael Corkery, Goodbye, Password. Banks Opt to Scan Fingers and Faces
Instead., N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22
/business/dealbook/goodbye-password-banks-opt-to-scan-fingers-and-facesinstead.html.
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have to decide if the holding will apply to the Facebook case. 82 If
Spokeo is applied to state laws like BIPA, the plaintiffs have a strong
argument that a per se violation will qualify as an injury in fact.
Defendants fighting BIPA lawsuits in state court have also
raised plaintiff’s lack of standing as an argument to dismiss.83 An
Illinois appellate court addressed the standing issue stemming from
BIPA in Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entertainment Corp.84 The plaintiff
in Rosenbach was a mother who purchased a season pass to Six
Flags theme park for her minor son.85 Six Flags obtained the son’s
fingerprint for biometric identification so he could be associated
with the season pass his mother purchased.86 The plaintiff asserted
Six Flags did not provide her or her son with written consent forms
and that she did not consent to the use of a scanner to collect her
son’s fingerprints when he obtained the pass.87 She did not claim that
any physical or monetary harm resulted from the fingerprint
scanning, but she did identify per se violations of BIPA, which
prompted Six Flags to question whether the plaintiff was an
“aggrieved” party under BIPA.88 Rosenbach argued that a privacy
violation codified by BIPA is enough of an injury to warrant
punishment under the act.89 The statute does not define aggrieved,
so the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois construed the term
to mean some “adverse effect or harm resulting from the
violation.”90
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Robins v, Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d at 1113.
See Paul Tassin, Six Flags Biometric Privacy Class Action Must Allege
Actual Harm, Says Court, TOP CLASS ACTIONS (Dec. 27, 2017),
https://topclassactions.com/lawsuit-settlements/lawsuit-news/829665-six-flagsbiometric-privacy-class-action-must-allege-actual-harm-says-court/ (explaining
that plaintiffs suing under BIPA in Illinois state court do not have standing unless
there has been an injury in fact).
84
Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2017 Ill. App. 160317; see Tassin,
supra note 83.
85
Rosenbach, 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160317 at ¶ 7–10; see Tassin, supra note 83.
86
Rosenbach at ¶ 7–10.
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Id.
88
Id.; see Tassin, supra note 83.
89
See Tassin, supra note 83.
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Rosenbach, 2017 Ill. App. 2d 160317 at ¶ 20.
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The Illinois appellate court’s interpretation means that state
lawsuits under BIPA will require more than a technical violation,
such as not notifying consumers of the finger scanning process. 91
Based on the holding in Rosenbach, citizens interested in filing a
BIPA lawsuit in state court will likely have to prove that a violation
caused them to experience tangible, concrete harm. Rosenbach’s
holding conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s recent Spokeo decision
because it bars plaintiffs filing in state court from establishing an
injury in fact based on the possibility of tangible harm, while Spokeo
would allow this in federal court.92 This tension forces plaintiffs to
either establish tangible harm, such as a compromised bank account,
or attempt to file a diversity action in federal court.93 BIPA is a step
forward in protecting the biometric information of Illinois’s citizens,
but standing conflicts could chill private suits seeking to enforce the
act.
C. Texas & Washington’s Biometric Privacy Laws
Texas passed the nation’s second commercial biometric privacy
law, the Texas Biometric Privacy Act (BPA), in 2009.94 Like the
Illinois BIPA, the Texas BPA aims to restrict and regulate the
commercial collection, retention, and disclosure of biometric
identifiers.95 However, the BPA does not offer Texans a private right
of action, leaving the attorney general as the law’s only enforcer.96
In the Texas statute, “biometric identifiers” are defined as “retina or
iris scans, fingerprints, voiceprint, or the recording of hand or face
geometry.”97 The definition of biometric identifiers in the Texas
91

See Tassin, supra note 83.
Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. denied 138
S.Ct. 931.
93
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012).
94
11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2009); Annemaria Duran,
Understanding the Texas Biometric Privacy Law as an Employer, SWIPECLOCK
WORKFORCE MGMT. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www3.swipeclock.com
/understanding-texas-biometric-privacy-law-employer/.
95
BUS. & COM. § 503.001.
96
Id.; see Tumeh, supra note 27 (explaining Texas wanted a more businessfriendly biometrics law so they could strike a better balance between privacy and
corporate interests than Illinois).
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BUS. & COM. § 503.001.
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statute closely mirrors that of the Illinois statute. Unlike Illinois, the
Texas BPA only requires notice, not written consent, for the
collection of biometric identifiers.98 Both statutes require the
destruction of stored biometric identifiers once certain requirements
are met.99 Yet another difference between the Illinois law and the
Texas law is that the former completely bans the sale and leasing of
commercially obtained biometric identifiers while the latter allows
for sale and leasing if a narrow set of conditions are met.100 In Texas,
businesses can sell or lease biometric information acquired from
customers or employees if the information is necessary to complete
a financial transaction expressly authorized by the individual that
provided the data.101
While the Illinois BIPA and the Texas BPA both restrict the
commercial collection, storage, and disclosure of biometric
information, the lack of a written consent requirement, the inability
for citizens to file suits, and the ability to sell or lease biometrics
make Texas’s law more favorable to businesses than Illinois’s.102
Allowing businesses to disclose biometric identifiers for a specific
purpose, like the completion of a transaction on behalf of the client
who submitted the information, is a reasonable concession to
businesses.103 In contrast, excluding a private right of action for
citizen enforcement and requiring notice, not consent, for the
collection of biometric identifiers means the law does not go far
enough to protect consumer privacy.104 State legislatures need to
balance competing privacy and business interests when drafting
biometric privacy statutes; instead, Texas’s legislature drafted an
imbalanced law that favors businesses.105
98

Id.; Tumeh, supra note 27.
See Tumeh, supra note 27 (noting that the Illinois law requires destruction
after the purpose of the information has been satisfied or three years after the
individual’s last contact with the corporation and that Texas law requires
destruction within a reasonable amount of time, up to a maximum of one year,
from when the purpose of the biometric information expires).
100
BUS. & COM. § 503.001; Tumeh, supra note 27.
101
BUS. & COM. § 503.001.
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740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008); BUS. & COM. § 503.001.
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BUS. & COM. § 503.001.
104
Id.
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Washington’s new biometric privacy act is more similar to
Texas’s somewhat lenient BPA than to Illinois’s strict BIPA. The
Washington Act is favorable to businesses, but it still differs from
its counterparts in a number of ways.106 First, the law’s definition of
“biometric identifiers” includes data or measurements from irises,
fingerprints, retinas, voices, and “other unique biological
characteristics or patterns,” but it does not list facial geometry.107 In
comparison, both Texas and Illinois include facial geometry in their
definitions of “biometric identifiers.”108 Second, the language of the
Washington statute forbids a person from “enroll[ing] a biometric
identifier for a commercial purpose without first providing notice,
obtaining consent or providing a mechanism to prevent the
subsequent use of a biometric identifier for a commercial
purpose.”109 “Person” means an “individual, partnership,
corporation, limited liability company, organization, association, or
any other legal or commercial entity” as defined by the statute.110
Additionally, “enroll” means “to capture a biometric identifier of an
individual, convert it into a reference template that cannot be
reconstructed into the original output image, and store it in a
database that matches the biometric identifier to a specific
individual.”111 The Washington BPA does not define “mechanism,”
and no cases have been filed requiring the term to be interpreted
leaving businesses with no guidelines to follow when implementing
a biometric privacy program.112
Washington’s law differs from Illinois’s and Texas’s in not only
its language but also in offering businesses more methods of
complying with the law.113 Other characteristics of the Washington
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COMP. STAT. 14/20; BUS. & COM. § 503.001; H.B. 1493, 65th Leg. Reg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).
107
H.B. 1493.
108
COMP. STAT. 14/20; BUS. & COM. § 503.001; see also Tumeh, supra note
27.
109
H.B. 1493.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
See id. (offering businesses the ability to comply with the law’s notification
requirements by asking for consent or even just making customers and employees
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law that mirror the Texas law are the absence of a private right of
action and the ability of businesses to sell, lease, and disclose
biometric information under certain circumstances.114 In fact, the
Washington law is less restrictive of disclosure than the Texas law
because the former carves out more exceptions that allow businesses
to share biometric identifiers with other businesses.115 Privacy
advocates argue that although the Washington law and the Texas
BPA improve biometric security, they both “lack teeth” because
citizens cannot enforce either one by bringing suits for violations.116
Without a private right of action, government attorneys decide when
to punish businesses for biometric privacy violations.117 Since the
attorneys enforcing the Washington statute and the Texas BPA will
have discretion over what cases to pursue, citizens with valid claims
may be ignored.118 Since citizens do not have a private right of action
under the Texas and Washington laws, neither state has experienced
the flood of biometric privacy litigation that Illinois has.119
D. Why Haven’t More States Passed Commercial Biometric
Privacy Laws?
As of January of 2018, Illinois, Washington, and Texas are still
the only three states that have enacted commercial biometric privacy
laws.120 Three interconnected concerns are holding back other states
from passing similar laws: the potential for class-action lawsuits, the
exact wording of state biometric laws, and individual state interests

aware of what companies use the biometric information for); HUNTON &
WILLIAMS PRIVACY & INFO. SEC. BLOG, supra note 48.
114
See Tumeh, supra note 27 (listing circumstances that allow Washington
businesses to sell, lease, and disclose biometric information).
115
H.B. 1493; Tumeh, supra note 27.
116
Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois
Cousin, BLOOMBERG BNA (July 18, 2017), https://www.bna.com/washingtonbiometric-privacy-n73014461920/.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Hanley Chew & Eric Ball, The Impact of the Surge of Biometric Data
Privacy Lawsuits Against Employers, L.J. NEWSL. (Jan. 2018),
http://www.lawjournalnewsletters.com/sites/lawjournalnewsletters/2018/01/01
/the-impact-of-the-surge-of-biometric-data-privacy-lawsuits-against-employers/.
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in business development.121 Despite its enactment in 2008, the
Illinois BIPA has only recently become the centerpiece of numerous
lawsuits against major tech companies including Facebook,122
Google,123 and Shutterfly.124 Legislators in other states likely do not
want to open the floodgates to a wave of class-action lawsuits by
passing a biometric privacy law too similar to the Illinois BIPA. 125
In response to the barrage of BIPA lawsuits in Illinois, others states
“may either reconsider the scope of their proposed biometric data
privacy laws or the wisdom of even enacting such laws.”126
If other states are committed to passing their own commercial
biometric privacy laws, they will have to decide how broad such a
law should be. The Illinois BIPA was once seen as a “possible
model” for similar laws, but class-action lawsuits and aggressive
lobbying from companies interested in collecting biometric
information, such as Facebook and Google, have scared states away
from strict limits on the usage of biometric information and the
inclusion of a private right of action.127 Without a viable model over
which technology companies and privacy advocates can
compromise, state legislatures have struggled to pass new biometric
privacy laws.128 Seven states have laws currently pending, but cannot
get the votes to finally pass them.129 Legislators in New York
struggled to even complete a proposal because of debate over how
to define “biometrics.”130 The Washington biometric privacy act,
which does not yet have an official title and was passed just last year,
121
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124
Norberg v. Shutterfly, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
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is one of the “best example[s] of industry pushback on attempts to
regulate biometric data” because of its business-friendly biometric
collection requirements and its lack of a citizen suit provision.131 One
of the bill’s co-sponsors, Washington Representative Mark
Harmsworth, revealed that if the bill included a private right of
action, he was unsure it would have passed.132 Consumer rights
organizations arguing for strict biometric privacy laws and tech
giants lobbying for business-friendly provisions, or even against the
passage of such laws as a whole, has made drafting, much less
passing, biometric privacy laws almost impossible.
Instead of “reconsidering the scope” of potential biometric
privacy laws, some states may not even attempt to pass them.133
Biometric privacy laws may deter businesses from expanding to
states that have enacted these types of statutes,134 and some states
may not be willing to sacrifice that growth in exchange for enhanced
consumer privacy. States considering biometric privacy laws must
also consider how such a law would affect businesses already in
operation, particularly corporations that have an interest in utilizing
their customers’ biometric identifiers. Potential liability under a new
biometric privacy law could force corporations to stop working on
innovative projects, or even leave the state entirely.135 Jeff Morris,
the other co-sponsor of Washington’s biometric privacy act, said
that balancing privacy rights and technological innovation “was a
challenge.” A federal biometric privacy law would alleviate the
pressure on states to balance economic development, innovation,
and consumer privacy. Simply put, zealous lobbying on behalf of
technology companies, lack of a model statute that privacy and
technology proponents can agree on, and fear of opening the door to
more class-action lawsuits have stopped other states from
successfully passing biometrics privacy laws.
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E. A Survey of American Privacy Law
Passing a federal law can be an arduous process.136 Until a
federal law focused solely on biometric privacy is passed, the states,
and to a lesser extent, existing federal laws, will bear the primary
burden of protecting citizens’ biometric information.137 To avoid a
drawn-out federal legislative process that still may not produce a
law, Congress may be able to add biometric privacy provisions, like
the ones already in the HIPAA and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA).138 After all, the United States has been fighting to protect
the privacy of its citizens since its humble beginnings.139 Samuel D.
Warren and Louis Brandeis catapulted privacy law into mainstream
prominence when the Harvard Law Review published their article
The Right to Privacy in 1890.140 Warren and Brandeis’ article
discusses an inherent right to privacy, the interplay between that
right, tort law, and intellectual property law, and both authors’
perceived limits on the right.141 The Right to Privacy garnered
widespread attention142 and paved the way for the privacy revolution
that took place after the turn of the century.143
136
See Elahe Izadi & Clare Foran, Why Congress Sometimes Can’t Even Pass
Moderate, Bipartisan Bills, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2013),
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support).
137
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See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320
(2012); Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106–102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
139
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INFORMATION AGE § 1:2 (Kristen Mathews ed., 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=914271 (analyzing the earliest American safeguards
against privacy violations including the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments).
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At the beginning of the 1900s, existing laws in the United States
were insufficient to handle the growing privacy concerns stemming
from evolving technology and citizens started filing “privacy tort”
lawsuits to protect their rights.144 In response to growing concerns
about wiretapping and the Supreme Court’s 5-4 decision in
Olmstead v. United States,145 the federal government began to pass
privacy laws to protect its citizens starting with the Federal
Communications Act of 1934.146 The remainder of the 20th century
saw the narrowing of the Fourth Amendment, although during that
same time period Congress passed numerous federal privacy laws to
protect Americans against government and corporate intrusion.147
One of the privacy laws, and the first health privacy law, passed
during the 20th century was HIPAA.148
HIPAA was passed in 1996 as a part of a congressional push for
healthcare reform in response to growing national concern over the
privacy of confidential information disclosed to healthcare
providers and insurance companies.149 Amongst other mandates that
are not relevant to this Recent Development, HIPAA ensures that
personal information Americans provide to healthcare providers
remains confidential.150 Furthermore, HIPAA “mandates uniform
standards for electronic data transmission of administrative and
financial data relating to patient health information.”151 Violations of
HIPAA can be costly; multiple violations in a single calendar year
144

See id. (explaining that new technology, like photography, led to privacy
torts, such as intrusion upon seclusion and public disclosure of private facts,
against media outlets).
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and seizures under the Fourth Amendment).
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will result in fines in excess of $1,000,000.152 HIPAA was installed
after the public pushed for healthcare reform, but HIPAA only
protects biometric privacy in one industry. Further, citizens alleging
HIPAA violations actually have no private federal right of action;
they can only file complaints to be investigated by the Department
of Justice or a state Attorney General’s office.153 If the Department
Justice or an Attorney General decides that a HIPAA claim has
merit, a case will be filed.154 The lack of a citizen suit provision may
mean that legitimate claims could get ignored by the Department of
Justice or an Attorney General’s office if they decide a case is not
worth filing. Certain existing federal laws include biometric privacy
provisions, but these laws are insufficient because they do not
provide uniform protection for all Americans against all
industries.155
F. Which Existing Federal Laws Address Biometric Privacy?
HIPAA is just one example of the many federal privacy laws
promulgated by Congress during the 20th century. 156 Federal law
takes a “sectoral approach” to privacy, meaning that “the primary
source of privacy laws in the United States takes the form of various
laws governing industry sectors.”157 HIPAA, GLBA, and the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) all have provisions
that include biometric privacy.158 HIPAA lists various categories of
“protected health information” (PHI) that are subject to data transfer
restrictions. Financial institutions must comply with the GLBA
which mandates the protection of “non-public personal
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information.”159 Although biometric identifiers are not explicitly
mentioned in GLBA, non-public personal information is read
broadly to include things that would be considered biometric
identifiers.160 Unfortunately, the GLBA allows for the sale of nonpublic information and is silent on consent for the acquisition of that
same information, giving rise to the question of whether or not the
law actually safeguards biometric privacy.161 This question is further
complicated by the dual status of biometric information, discussed
in Part I. Although biometric identifiers are unique to individuals,
making them private, the whole world can see, and possibly
duplicate, those identifiers, making them public as well. For GLBA
to apply to biometric information, lawyers will need to navigate this
odd dichotomy. Lastly, educational institutions are explicitly
restricted from disclosing student biometric information without
parental consent under FERPA.162 Some exceptions to FERPA
apply, but its provisions provide far more robust safeguards than the
GLBA.163
G. Which Existing State Laws Address Biometric Privacy?
Many states that have not passed or introduced a biometric
privacy bill have addressed the topic in existing laws.164 For
example, North Carolina used an existing law, the Identity Theft
Protection Act, to protect biometric privacy because it included
“biometric data” as a form of identifying information.165 The North
Carolina law “requires any entity conducting business in the state
and maintaining personal information of a resident to take
reasonable measures to protect the information against unauthorized
access.”166 Many other states also have data breach laws that protect
biometric information, including South Carolina.167 The South
159
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S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-20-110 (2008).

186

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON.

[VOL. 19: 161

Carolina law includes “information issued by a governmental or
regulatory entity that will uniquely identify an individual” in its
definition of “personal identifying information.”168 This broad
definition could be construed to include information like
fingerprints or retina data, but since it does not explicitly list
biometric information within its definition of “personal identifying
information,” protection is not guaranteed.
H. Why State Laws and Existing Federal Laws Do Not Adequately
Protect Biometric Privacy
Existing state and federal laws do not adequately protect
biometric privacy in the United States. The sectoral approach to
privacy regulation is simultaneously too restrictive and not
restrictive enough.169 Many federal privacy laws overlap with one
another because many businesses walk a thin line between one or
more sectors leading to excess regulation.170 The unfortunate
businesses subject to multiple privacy laws struggle to comply with
the seemingly endless number of uncertain, inconsistent
provisions.171 On the opposite end of the privacy regulation spectrum
sit businesses and organizations that fall into the many gaps created
by dividing our economy into sectors. Passing a federal biometric
privacy law would set uniform standards for commercial
organizations across the country, and even though the standards may
require some interpretation, it would eliminate sectoral gaps. The
argument against letting the states serve as the primary defenders of
biometric privacy is far less complex: state laws only extend so far.
A federal law will provide protection for the biometric information
of every American and states will not need to pass their own laws or
scramble to adapt existing laws to the new concerns surrounding
biometrics.
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IV. WHAT SHOULD A FEDERAL BIOMETRIC PRIVACY LAW LOOK
LIKE?
Despite the array of federal privacy laws that Congress has
signed into law, no reports had surfaced at the time of this Recent
Development identifying legislation that addresses commercial
biometric privacy. If legislation is introduced, Congress will have to
decide how to define the term “biometric identifier,” what limits to
set on the collection and storage of biometric information, whether
or not businesses should be able to sell, or disclose that same
information, and finally whether or not to include a private right of
action.172 Making decisions on the exact wording of a federal
biometrics law will be complicated by the immense lobbying power
large technology companies wield.173 Corporate lobbying efforts
resulted in the watered-down biometric privacy law that Washington
passed and have even stopped other states from passing similar laws
entirely.174 If Congress decides to introduce a biometric privacy bill,
it must properly balance consumer rights and business development
in a way that makes the bill politically viable.
A. How a Federal Law Should Define “Biometric Identifiers”
Congress could use a definition similar to those contained in
Texas and Illinois statutes, or they could use a less detailed, but
potentially broader, definition like Washington’s.175 Alternatively,
Congress could use the Biometric Research Group’s expansive
definition of biometrics, which includes both physical and
behavioral characteristics.176 To be as inclusive as possible,
Congress could even use the Biometric Research Group’s definition
and then add a non-exhaustive list of biometric identifiers for
172
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clarity.177 A federal biometric privacy law should be expansive and
forward-thinking, meaning that Congress should embrace the
Biometric Research Group’s definition and formulate their own
non-exhaustive list of identifiers. This would expand the law to
cover not only physical characteristics but also behavioral
characteristics.178 Adding a non-exhaustive list of biometric
identifiers to the definition of biometrics would make the law
adaptable enough to sufficiently cover both existing, and future,
applications of biometric identification technology. Litigation
deciding whether certain characteristics should be considered a
biometric identifier is inevitable, so Congress should list as many
identifiers as they can to at least reduce the number of lawsuits. The
constantly evolving field of biometrics precludes Congress from
developing a complete list of biometric identifiers, but that should
not stop them from drafting the most inclusive definition possible.
While predicting future applications of biometric technology is
difficult, a clause preceding the non-exhaustive list of identifiers that
clearly states the list is subject to expansion is necessary.
B. How a Federal Law Should Address the Collection and Storage
of Biometric Information
First and foremost, Congress must decide if a federal law should
require notice and consent for the collection of biometric
information, like Illinois, or just notice, like Texas and
Washington.179 To make the federal law’s collection section even
more robust, Congress could even require a unique document for
biometric collection completely separate from any user agreements
or other corporate documents. By creating a unique consent form for
the collection of biometric information, citizens would be less likely
to blindly sign away their biometric identifiers as part of a massive
user agreement. Including notice and consent requirements would
hold commercial entities to a higher standard and is thus the
preferable approach for Congress to take.

177

King, supra note 2.
Id.
179
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/20 (2008); 11 TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 503.001 (West 2009); Wash. H.B. 1493.
178

APR. 2018]

Fingerprint Not Recognized

189

After determining how to restrict the collection of biometric
information, Congress will then need to lay out requirements for the
safe storage and timely destruction of biometric records. The least
restrictive storage requirement Congress could mandate is one that
allows commercial entities to maintain biometric records for “a
reasonable time.”180 Washington’s biometric privacy uses this broad
storage provision, and because the law is so new, the outer limits of
the standard have not been established.181 Washington also
supplements its “reasonable time” storage mandate with three
exceptions that allow businesses to store the information longer.182
Texas and Illinois included similar “reasonable time” requirements
and added time limits on storage as well.183 To strike the proper
balance between privacy rights and business interests, Congress
should model federal storage and destruction provisions after the
ones employed by Texas and Illinois. A maximum storage period
set three years, or less, from the collection of the information could
be combined with carveouts for businesses that have exceptional
reasons to maintain biometric records for longer and a “reasonable
time” standard to produce the best storage and mandatory
destruction provision possible.
C. Proposed Characteristics of a Provision on the Sale and
Disclosure of Biometric Information
The third significant consideration Congress will need to address
is the sale and disclosure of biometric information.184 Illinois
completely banned the sale of biometric information but allows for
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disclosure if required by another law.185 BIPA also allows disclosure
if a company is faced with a subpoena, warrant, or if disclosure is
“necessary to complete a financial transaction.”186 For disclosure to
be authorized under any scenario, BIPA requires consent from the
individual that provided the biometric information.187 Washington
and Texas let commercial entities sell and disclose biometric
information if certain exceptions apply.188 Texas’s list of exceptions
for disclosure is the same as Illinois’s list, and the former applies
those same exceptions to the sale of biometric information.189
Washington’s list of exceptions for the sale and disclosure of
biometric information includes the ones listed by Texas and Illinois
in addition to four more exceptions.190 To strike a balance between
corporate interests and biometric privacy, Congress should adopt the
Texas approach. Giving businesses the right to sell and disclose
biometric information in a small number of circumstances will
protect privacy interests and will not stifle a business’s ability to
operate.
D. Should a Federal Law Include a Private Right of Action?
Absolutely.
The final major decision that Congress will need to make is
whether to include a private right of action such as the one in
Illinois’s BIPA.191 Adding a private right of action will give the law
the “teeth” that detractors of Texas and Washington’s laws are
clamoring for, but it could also raise a number of legal questions and
lead to a flood of new lawsuits.192 Meticulous drafting will not save
185
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an extremely innovative federal law governing biometric privacy
law from lawsuits hinging on statutory interpretation. That being
said, clearly defining relevant terms and producing a comprehensive
law will minimize litigation. Moreover, a private right of action will
give consumers and employees the power to protect their rights
without relying on an Attorney General’s office. Other laws, like
HIPAA, have only proven that submitting claims to a government
office for review will not always provide the same level of
protection as a citizen suit provision.193 Government attorneys have
limited time and resources to investigate claims so every violation
submitted will not be given equal consideration. Compromised
biometric databases could ruin the lives of countless Americans, and
cases involving delicate biometric information should not be
selectively pursued based on the discretion of a small group of
attorneys. An increase in litigation stemming from a citizen suit
provision is a small price to pay for more robust protection of
American biometric information. Congress needs to balance privacy
and business interests to make sure a federal biometric privacy law
is politically viable, but they cannot fold under pressure from the
tech sector and exclude a private right of action from the statute.
V. CONCLUSION
The explosion of interest in biometrics across the United States
over the last few years has raised serious concerns about the safety
of biometric technology and what businesses do with biometric
information. The utility of biometrics is obvious and continually
expanding, but the improper taking or disclosing of such
information can irreparably harm innocent employees or consumers.
Some states have taken the initiative and passed laws solely
dedicated to the protection of biometric information used in
commercial settings. Other states and the federal government have
worked biometric privacy safeguards into existing laws or have
interpreted existing laws to cover biometric privacy. However,
many states have not directly addressed commercial biometric
privacy, and even the existing safeguards offer varying levels of
incomplete protection.
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A federal law would offer uniform protection across the country,
though the level of protection would depend on a myriad of factors
including corporate lobbying, privacy lobbying, and state
ideological differences. Regardless of the political hurdles on the
track to ratification, Congress should aim for a biometric privacy
law that is expansive and provides a private right of action so
citizens do not have to rely on government actors for protection. A
private right of action may lead to more litigation and disputes over
legal technicalities, but those minor consequences are preferable to
promulgating a feeble law that forces citizens to hope the attorney
general decides to act when a complaint is made. When enforcement
is handled solely by an attorney general’s office, many cases will
never be filed because of discretionary decisions and information
gathering deficiencies.194 Biometric information is invaluable to its
owner, and the level of protection it is afforded should reflect that.
Congress must take note of the how much inherent value biometric
information holds and enact a federal law that fills current legislative
gaps and safeguards the biometric data of American employees and
consumers.
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